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Abstract 
 
This paper reports on an innovative policy for central government funding to local passenger 
transport services in New Zealand, that ties funding directly to performance. 
 
The new policy, known as Patronage Funding, was developed and implemented by Transfund 
New Zealand, with assistance from consultants.  Under the policy, government funding to the 
regions for public transport services is based directly on the patronage generated.  This leaves 
responsibility for service planning with regional government, but encourages them to improve 
services in such a way as to generate additional patronage.  The payment rates are based on 
estimates of both the user benefits and externality benefits of improving services and hence 
attracting additional passengers.  The externality component comprises benefits associated with 
reduced road congestion, safety and environmental benefits.  Hence, the payment rates vary by 
city, time period (peak/off-peak) and distance travelled. 
 
The paper describes the economic theory and the analyses underlying the new policy, key aspects 
of its implementation, and experience in the first six months since its introduction in November 
2000.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper reports on an innovative policy for central government funding support to local passenger 
transport services in New Zealand. 
 
The new policy, known as Patronage Funding, was developed and implemented by Transfund New 
Zealand, with assistance from consultants.  Under the policy, central government funding to the regions for 
public transport services is based directly on the patronage generated.  This leaves responsibility for service 
planning with regional government, but encourages them to improve services in such a way as to generate 
additional patronage. 
 
The rates of funding (per passenger) are based on estimates of both the user benefits and externality benefits 
of improving services and hence attracting additional passengers.  The externality component comprises 
benefits associated with reduced road congestion, safety and environmental benefits.  Hence the payment 
rates vary by city, time period (peak/off peak) and distance travelled. 
 
The paper describes the economic theory and the analyses underlying the new policy, together with key 
aspects of its implementation, and summarises the experience in the first six months since its introduction in 
November 2000. 
 
The paper is structured into the following sections: 
 
2: New Zealand public transport system and funding 
3: Key features of the Patronage Funding scheme 
4: The economic theory 
5: Assessment of mode switching  benefit rates 
6: Assessment of public transport user benefit rates 
7: Basis of Transfund payments 
8: Phased implementation – the 'Kick-start Funding' scheme 
9: Progress and outcomes to date 
10: Some on-going issues 
11: Conclusions. 
 
 
2. NEW ZEALAND PUBLIC TRANSPORT SYSTEM AND FUNDING 
2.1 Public Transport Regulation and Administration 
Public transport services in New Zealand are provided by bus (in all urban centres as well as rural and 
longer-distance services), rail (suburban 'heavy' rail services in Auckland and Wellington) and ferry (a 
significant role in Auckland, a small role in several other centres). 
 
Since major regulatory reforms in 1991, all public transport operators have been independent private 
companies operating on a normal commercial basis.  
 
The 1991 reforms also introduced a 'semi-deregulated' system, with a lot of similarities (but also significant 
differences) to the UK (outside London) system.  The New Zealand system has been described in detail in 
previous Thredbo series papers (Wallis 1993, 1995).   
 
Key features of relevance here include: 
 
• Regional councils (elected government bodies, 14 covering New Zealand) have the prime responsibility 
for specifying, contracting and funding public transport services. 
• Operators are permitted to register services to be provided on a commercial (unsubsidised) basis.  
Regional councils may only reject such registrations on specified grounds (eg environmental or traffic 
management grounds, or having an adverse effect on other subsidised services).  
• Regional councils decide what public transport services are required in addition to these commercially 
registered services.  These additional services are specified (in a Regional Passenger Transport Plan) in 
terms of routes, frequencies, capacities, maximum fares and minimum vehicle quality standards. 
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• Regional councils then secure these services through a competitive tendering process.  Contracts are 
usually on a 'net cost' basis (ie bidders estimate the expected fare revenue and submit bids on the basis 
of the net subsidy required; the successful operator is then paid the bid subsidy and retains the fare 
revenue). 
 
Transfund New Zealand is the central government agency that purchases road and public transport 
outcomes, funded through dedicated fuel taxes, road user charges (for diesel vehicles) and license fees.  
Transfund also sets the overall guidelines to be followed by regional councils when competitively tendering 
public transport services (the Competitive Pricing Procedures, or CPPs). 
 
2.2 The Previous Public Transport Funding and Evaluation System 
Recent statistics indicate that about 84 million passenger trips (boardings) pa were made on local 
commercial and contracted public transport services (excluding school contract services in rural areas) in 
New Zealand: this is an average of some 31 boardings pa per person in the areas served. 
 
Total public funding (subsidy) for these services was about $82 M pa1, ie approximately $1 per passenger 
boarding.  Although precise statistics are not available (because of the nature of the commercial system), the 
services overall have an average fare-box cost recovery in the range 60-70%, which is relatively high by 
developed world standards.  The overall proportion of passengers carried on commercial services is about 
one third: in the three largest centres, the proportions of bus passengers carried on commercial services are 
51% in Auckland, 26% in Wellington and 4% in Christchurch. 
 
Prior to Patronage Funding, Transfund contributed about $43m pa of the total subsidy for existing public 
transport services. This figure had been capped nationally since 1996 based on historic levels.  Of this $43m, 
about $36m was for general public transport and $7m for specific social services. The contribution to general 
services was based on a funding share of 40% of bus and ferry subsidies, and 60% of rail subsidies.  These 
Transfund funding shares were independent of the level of patronage of the services; and indeed the 
amount paid by Transfund to each region was dependent on the region's service level and fares policies, 
and not related to any measure of the benefits of these policies. 
 
Prior to Patronage Funding, the only way that new passenger transport initiatives could receive funding 
was through the Alternatives to Road (ATR) evaluation procedures, a cost-benefit evaluation that was 
introduced in 1997, and was designed to evaluate passenger transport investment and funding in a 
comparable manner to road investment.  The ATR procedures involve an 'efficiency ratio' (ER), which is 
equivalent to a benefit-cost ratio (see NZIER, 1998), but with benefits and costs measured net of revenue 
such as fares.  During 2000/01 only, passenger transport and road projects with an ER greater than 3.0 
qualify for Transfund funding.  Transfund's medium-term funding 'hurdle' rate is 4.0 (reflecting Transfund's 
budget constraints). 
 
An issue that arose was that passenger services with a high efficiency ratio generally were already 
commercial.  By contrast, roads with a high benefit-cost ratio are not made available to commercial 
operators to augment the Road fund. Roads in New Zealand are fully funded by the government, with no 
private sector involvement and only one toll road. Thus, under the benefit-cost ranking system, no 
passenger transport schemes were funded, because high ranking Road projects had first access to the 
dedicated fund.  Patronage funding was developed as a means by which to contribute to passenger 
transport in the same proportion of benefits generated as roads, irrespective of whether the services were 
commercial or subsidised. 
 
2.3 Reasons for Changes to the Funding System 
The Labour Alliance Coalition Government came into power in late 1999 with a goal to increase national 
funding of public transport services, and to increase their usage: it  sought a simple, low-cost means to 
achieve that while still ensuring prudent use of funds. 
 
Patronage Funding was developed as the key policy to  achieve this goal.  Its objectives were to: 
 
• ensure that funding for passenger transport services goes where it is most needed (eg where there is 
road congestion) 
                                                     
1 All figures in $NZ.  1 $NZ is equivalent (June 2001) to about 3.95 NoK, 0.50 Euro or  US$0.42.   
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• reward regional councils whose passenger transport strategies attract more passengers  
• provide the opportunity to fund new passenger transport services. 
 
Unlike other Transfund investments, funding for existing services had hitherto not been related to their 
value to passengers, nor their effectiveness at providing road system benefits.  Three studies, each analysing 
peak-period public transport services in different key congested traffic corridors, concluded that the subsidy 
to each service (to provide higher service levels and/or lower fares) had an ER between 2.0 and 3.0, and 
would therefore not qualify under Transfund's previous funding policies.  Other studies had indicated that 
new public transport initiatives (eg new rollingstock, improved transport interchanges) would also have 
difficulty qualifying for funding: prior to Patronage Funding, no new services had in fact received 
Transfund funding. 
 
Adoption of a system whereby Transfund pays for results rather than shares the cost of inputs, creates a 
financial incentive for regional councils to take cost-effective actions to increase patronage (eg. through 
improved public transport services, marketing initiatives or new infrastructure).  Transfund is able to take a 
'hands-off' approach and leave each regional council free to develop its own strategy for increasing 
patronage, because each regional council has a strong financial incentive to increase patronage at the 
minimum cost.  
 
 
3. KEY FEATURES OF THE PATRONAGE FUNDING SCHEME 
Prior to describing the various economic and technical analyses, this section presents an overview of the 
Patronage Funding scheme adopted as a result of these analyses plus various other (financial and political) 
considerations.  Key features of the scheme are summarised as follows. 
 
Key Principles 
(i) Transfund pays regional councils on the basis of the patronage carried on all services in the region, 
irrespective of the characteristics of the individual services. The funding basis does not differ between 
modes, or between contracted and commercial services. 
 
(ii) The PF scheme involves: 
• a base level of payment for carrying a base level of patronage: these levels are based on the 
Transfund payment amounts and the total patronage carried in the financial year prior to the 
start of the scheme (1999/00); plus 
• variable patronage–related payment rates applying to any variations in annual patronage from 
the base levels. 
 
Constraints on Payments 
(iii) During a short-term transition period (up to 2003), Transfund will not reduce its funding to any 
region below the agreed base level, in order to minimise any adverse effects on services or on local 
funding requirements.  Thus the variable patronage-related payments in this period would apply 
only to patronage increases, not any decreases. 
 
(iv) Transfund requires each regional council to at least maintain its own base level of regional 
expenditure; and Transfund will in no case contribute more than 80% of total expenditure in any 
region.  (This latter point is only likely to be an issue in the event of strong patronage growth over 
some years, because Transfund’s share of total regional expenditure is currently less than 50%). 
 
Payment Rates 
(v) The variable payment rates per passenger are based on 'externality' benefits of improving the public 
transport system, and thus attracting additional passengers and benefitting existing users: 
 
• 'externality' benefits include the benefits of travellers switching to public transport from other 
modes (additional to those benefits perceived by the mode switchers themselves): these benefits 
relate to changes in car traffic volumes (road user travel times, fuel costs, accidents and 
environmental impacts) and changes in externality costs for other alternative modes (principally 
safety benefits); 
• 'externality' benefits also include the benefits of improved public transport services (required to 
attract additional passengers) to the existing public transport users (eg increased service 
frequency, reduced fares). 
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(vi) The payment rates adopted are as set out in Table 1.  There are three alternative sets of variable rates 
per passenger (boarding), according to different circumstances and preferences: 
 
• All rates differ between peak and off-peak periods and between each of the three main regions 
and the 'other' regions – principally according to the degree of congestion. 
• The basic ('hybrid') rates have a 'flag-fall' (per passenger boarding) component and a 'distance' 
(per passenger kilometre) component. 
• The 'simplified' rates are derived from the 'hybrid' rates based on the average passenger trip 
distance in each region.  Each regional council may choose whether to adopt the 'simplified' rates 
or the 'hybrid' rates. 
• 'Other (smaller) regions were also given the option of choosing a flat rate over all time periods (in 
order to reduce administration costs). 
 
(vii) Transfund will review these payment rates annually (it has recently confirmed that the 2000/01 rates 
given will also apply for 2001/02). 
 
Phased Implementation: 'Kick-start Funding' 
(viii) To encourage a short-term one-off boost to both patronage and funding, the initial phase of Patronage 
Funding (known as 'Kick-start Funding') involves Transfund paying not only for additional 
passengers (applying the above rates) but also a proportion of the input costs for approved additional 
services (further details in Section 8). 
 
TABLE 1:  TRANSFUND VARIABLE PAYMENT RATES BY REGION (1) 
 All rates per additional passenger boarding 
Region Period 
Auckland Wellington Canterbury Others 
'Hybrid rates' (vary with trip length) (2)     
Peak (5) $1.45+$0.21*D $1.05+$0.17*D $0.30+$0.09*D $0.20+$0.08*D 
Off-peak $0.15+$0.06*D $0.15+$0.06*D $0.15+$0.06*D $0.15+$0.06*D 
'Simplified' rates (averaged trip lengths) (3)    
Peak (5) $3.00 $2.90 $1.00 $0.90 
Off-peak $0.70 $0.70 $0.70 $0.70 
All periods (4) (flat rate) - - - $0.85 
Notes:  (1) Rates apply to 2000/01 and 2001/02.  All figures exclude GST. 
 (2) D = trip distance (kms) 
 (3) Based on 'hybrid' rates by applying average trip length in each centre. 
 (4) Weighted average of peak and off-peak rates, which may be used in 'other' regions (to avoid the need for 
records of patronage by peak v off-peak). 
 (5) Peak rates apply to any period of four hours on weekdays (period chosen by each regional council). 
 
 
4. THE ECONOMIC THEORY 
This section provides an overview of the economic basis for deriving the patronage payment rates.  Fuller 
details are provided in various consultant working papers prepared as part of the development of 
Patronage Funding (NZIER 2000, BAH 2000). 
 
4.1 Rationale for Subsidy 
An individual's decision to travel by public transport or an alternative mode is based on the 'costs' (or 
disutility) that he/she perceives personally (eg travel time, fares, car operating costs, parking charges, 
personal safety).  Individuals do not generally take into account the 'externalities' associated with their 
choices, ie the economic costs these choices impose (without compensation) on other parties (eg. increased 
in road congestion).  Given such externalities, and in the absence of optimum road pricing, it may be 
efficient (ie enhance economic welfare) to subsidise public transport as an alternative to car use. 
 
The economic analysis was concerned with determining the optimum passenger-related subsidy rate that 
would provide the same marginal economic return as is achieved in the roads sector, through the use of 
Transfund's benefit: cost evaluation criteria for road projects.  Significantly, the road sector evaluation and 
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funding criteria result in Transfund funding a proportion of the costs of road projects; while the Patronage 
Funding approach is concerned with Transfund's funding to passenger transport being directly related to 
the benefits, irrespective of the costs.  
 
4.2 Warranted Subsidy Rate 
For the evaluation of road schemes, Transfund applies 'conventional' cost-benefit analysis procedures to 
derive a resource benefit: cost ratio for each scheme: 
  Rr = Br/Cr 
where  Rr = benefit: cost ratio for road schemes 
   Br = PV net road user and externality benefits 
   Cr = PV road provider costs (both capital and recurrent, to government). 
 
Transfund then makes a funding contribution, provided that Rr is at least equal to a pre-determined 'hurdle' 
rate (Hr).  Hr reflects the budget constraints, and is varied from time-to-time depending on the availability of 
funds; it is currently 3.0, but the medium-term rate is estimated at around 4.0. 
 
For evaluations of public transport expenditure, previously Transfund had derived an equivalent 'efficiency 
ratio' (ER): 
   Rp = Bp/Cp 
 where  Rp = efficiency ratio for public transport schemes 
   Bp = PV net transport user and externality benefits 
   Cp = PV net public transport provider costs (to government). 
 
For consistency with road evaluation, Transfund should make a funding contribution provided that Rp 
exceeds a hurdle rate Hp.  Other factors being equal, for optimum allocation of resources Hp should be set 
equal to Hr – but see below.  
 
To derive the warranted patronage-related payment rate, this formula needs to be inverted, ie: 
   Cp = Bp/Hp 
 where now Cp = warranted payment rate (per additional passenger) 
   Bp = benefit from that payment (per additional passenger) 
   Hp = appropriate hurdle rate for public transport expenditure. 
 
That is, the warranted payment rate (per additional passenger) equals the benefit (per additional passenger) 
divided by the hurdle rate that reflects the scarcity of funds.  This result is unsurprising.  It reflects that, if 
payments are made at this rate, then the marginal benefits secured (per $ funds) are equal to the benefits 
(per $) from funding the marginal road scheme for which the benefit: cost ratio just meets the hurdle rate 
(Hr).  
 
As noted earlier, the benefits (Bp) comprise two externality components – benefits relating to mode 
switching (principally to/from car) and benefits to existing public transport users: 
   Bp = Bpr + Bpp 
where Bpr = road user and related (externality) benefits, per additional public transport 
passenger 
 Bpp = existing public transport user benefits, per additional public transport passenger. 
 
The basis for calculating Bpr and Bpp is given in subsequent sections of the paper. 
 
4.3 Treatment of Risk and Irreversibility 
For road and passenger transport capital projects, Transfund funds on the basis of estimated benefits.  There 
is a risk that these benefits will not occur, but for typical projects it is usually not feasible to recoup much (if 
any) of the original funding – it is irreversible.  Patronage Funding, on the other hand, is only paid out once 
the benefits have occurred – that is, once additional passengers have been attracted – so it involves no risk 
with respect to achieving the benefits. 
 
In order to reflect the lower risk, NZIER evaluated the risk using the real options theory (based on Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994).  They concluded that Transfund's BCR hurdle rate can be described as:  
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   Hr = 1+ f+α 
 where  f = risk premium for irreversibility 
   α = additional mark-up to reflect funding constraints. 
 
NZIER estimated that (f) for road projects was around 1.0; and hence, by deduction (α) is currently also 
around 1.0 (corresponding to Hr = 3.0), although around 2.0 in the medium-term. 
 
As Patronage Funding involves no irreversible commitments of funds, f=0 in this case.  Thus the appropriate 
hurdle rate for public funding is (1+α), or about 1.0 lower than for capital projects.  Thus, for even-
handedness with road projects, the appropriate funding rate for the Patronage Funding scheme is equal to 
Bp/(1+α).  If this rate is paid to attract additional passengers, then Patronage Funding will offer as good 
value for limited funds as road projects. 
 
 
5. ASSESSMENT OF MODE-SWITCHING BENEFIT RATES 
5.1 Overview 
This section summarises how we developed ways to assess and quantify the externality benefits of mode 
switching, as a result of changes in the attractiveness of the public transport system.  (The following section 
covers externality benefits to public transport users).  
 
Key features of this concept include: 
 
• The benefit values relate to marginal changes (increases or decreases) in public transport usage, 
however caused.  
• The benefit values allow for the likely travel behavioural response of public transport users to such a 
marginal change (ie a proportion of public transport users may switch to/from car driver, and to/from 
other modes). 
• The methods and costs of achieving these benefits (eg through improved services or lower fares) are 
not relevant to the benefit values. 
• The values of interest are the unit benefits per person switching to/from public transport. 
 
Figure 1 sets out the structure of the assessment, which involved: 
 
• Estimation of 'diversion proportions', ie the proportions of any increase in public transport patronage 
(resulting from enhancements to services) which would be diverted from each alternative mode. 
• Estimation of the unit externality benefits, for travellers diverted from each alternative mode, under 
four categories (environmental, safety, decongestion and parking). 
• Weighting of the unit externality benefits by mode by the relevant diversion proportions, to derive the 
weighted average unit externality benefits, for each category and overall. 
 
The following sub-sections summarise the work undertaken relating to each of the Figure 1 boxes. 
 
5.2 Diversion Proportions 
The 'diversion proportions' of interest here are the proportions of additional public transport users, 
resulting from a marginal change (from whatever cause) in the attractiveness of public transport relative to 
all other modes, that would switch to/from each alternative mode.   
 
Of particular relevance to the project are systematic variations in diversion proportions in ways that could 
be applied to differentiate between public transport services in different areas/corridors, time periods, trip 
lengths etc.  For project purposes, diversion proportions were required on both a per passenger trip basis 
and a per passenger kilometre basis.  
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Figure 1:  Assessment of Mode-Switching Benefit Rates – Overview  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two main sources of evidence on diversion proportions were used: 
 
• Review of international evidence on diversion proportions in urban areas, undertaken by BoozAllen 
for Transfund (BAH 2000). 
• Analysis of responses to Customer Satisfaction Surveys of public transport in main NZ urban centres, 
in particular relating to alternative means of travel if public transport were not available.  
 
Based on review of the evidence, best estimates were derived of diversion proportions, disaggregated by 
key differentiating variables, ie urban centre, public transport mode used and time of day (peak v off-peak). 
 
Diversion proportions per passenger were then converted to diversion proportions per passenger kilometre, 
allowing for differences by trip length (longer trips tend to divert to car, shorter to walk/cycle).  
 
5.3 Environmental Benefits 
Environmental benefits from the shift from alternative modes to public transport relate principally to car-
based modes.  The main environmental effects of relevance at the margin were noise, air quality, greenhouse 
gases and water quality. 
 
A review of key New Zealand and international literature was undertaken to derive appropriate values.  It 
was found that: 
 
• The consensus of evidence is for average valuations for all significant effects in the order of 5¢/vehicle 
km, but with a wide range of uncertainty. 
• Marginal valuations (appropriate for this project) differ significantly from average valuations: for some 
impacts they will be lower, for others higher.  Overall marginal valuations appear likely to exceed 
average valuations. 
• Over all significant effects, marginal valuations seem most likely to be around twice the average 
valuations, ie in the order of 10¢/veh km.  
 
We concluded that: 
 
• For car traffic, best estimates of marginal rates were 10¢/vehicle km for peak (congested) conditions, 
5¢/vehicle km for off-peak (uncongested) conditions. 
• For walk and cycle modes, zero environmental externalities were assumed. 
Environmental Benefits 
• Principally applies to car-
based modes 
• Main effects – noise, 
local air pollution, water 
pollution, greenhouse 
gases 
Safety Benefits 
• Applies to all modes 
• May not all be 
externalities 
"Decongestion' Benefits 
• Applies to car-based 
modes (incl passengers, 
taxis) 
• Time and vehicle op cost 
changes for road travel. 
Parking Benefits 
• Applies to car driver 
mode 
• Difference resource costs 
less user charge. 
• By city, CBD v other 
destinations. 
Diversion Proportions 
• By mode (driver, passenger, taxi, cycle, walk, no trip). 
• Derive per person kilometre 
• Disaggregate by city, PT mode, peak v off-peak. 
Estimation of Generalised 
Travel Time v Traffic 
Volume Curves 
• Kimber & Hollis method 
• Regional transport 
models 
Allowance for Secondary 
Effects 
• 'Induced traffic' factors 
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• Allowance should be made for the environmental externalities of any buses removed from the traffic 
stream.   
 
5.4 Safety Benefits 
Analysis of marginal safety (externality) benefits was a difficult aspect, for several reasons: 
 
• While we were able to make use of good data on NZ accident numbers and costs (by urban area, mode 
and time period), adequate data on cost causality were not available. 
• The accident cost rates derived are average rates, which do not necessarily apply at the margin. For 
instance, increased peak-period road traffic results in lower speeds, and most likely in lower accident 
costs per vehicle kilometre). 
• It is unclear what proportions of accident costs are 'internalities' (incorporated in costs faced by the 
user) and should thus be excluded from the results: we assumed that all accident costs were 
externalities. 
Table 2 presents a summary of the estimated costs per person km by mode (aggregated over all age groups).  
The very high cost rates for cycle mode relative to bus and car are notable: this has substantial implications 
for any policies that result in switching of travel mode from bus (or car) to cycle. 
 
TABLE 2:  SUMMARY OF ACCIDENT COST RATES (1)  
 Social cost rate - ¢/km 
Mode Weekday Peak Weekday Off-peak Weekend 
Rate/person km    
Bus 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Car 1.8 2.9 2.7 
Cycle 33.6 43.5 32.0 
Walk 17.6 18.9 19.2 
Rate/vehicle km    
Car 2.5 4.4 4.9 
Notes (1)   Based on NZ Land Transport Safety Authority data for 1997-98 plus related sources.  
 
5.5 'Decongestion' Benefits 
This part of the assessment was concerned with estimation of the marginal changes in travel time on the 
congested peak period road networks in the main centres (Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch), ie. the 
slope of the travel time v traffic volume function.  It was one of the most demanding, but important, parts of 
the whole assessment. 
 
Two separate approaches were used, and compared: 
 
• The Kimber & Hollis (1979) method, to assess the travel time v volume function on each corridor and at 
each bottleneck, based on the current prevailing peak period traffic volumes and capacities.  This was 
the primary source of estimates. 
• Application of Regional Transport Models (Auckland and Wellington) to establish the peak period 
travel time v volume functions on a region-wide basis.  This was used as a check on the above 
approach. 
Key features of our application of the Kimber and Hollis methodology were: 
 
• The decongestion effects are a function of two variables: the shape of the demand profile over a two 
hour or longer time period; and the congestion index. 
• The 'congestion index' is the ratio of the peak 60-minute demand volume to the ruling intersection or 
bottleneck approach capacity during the same time interval (ie the peak 1-hour volume/capacity, or 
V/C ratio).  For V/C between 0.85 (no congestion) and 1.15 (stable congestion), marginal changes in 
travel times increase rapidly from near zero to the upper threshold.  
• The slope of the travel time/volume function for each major intersection was estimated directly 
through a mathematical formulation, incorporating the slope of the demand profile and the 'congestion 
index'.  These estimates were validated against direct field measurements in a few critical cases.  
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• The total magnitude of the delays within a travel corridor was calculated as the sum of the separate 
value at each important intersection or bottleneck approach: only a few individual intersection or 
bottleneck approaches were found to be critical in each corridor. 
• The results were derived in terms of the total travel time savings (minutes/day) resulting from a 
uniform 1% change in peak period traffic volumes, for each major corridor and hence aggregated over 
the city as a whole. 
• Standard values of motorist time savings were then applied, to derive a marginal 'decongestion' cost 
per marginal peak car kilometre on the road network. 
'Secondary' Effects – induced traffic 
The above results were based on an assumption of a fixed route assignment, and did not allow for 
'secondary' effects in response to changes in traffic volumes in congested urban networks: these effects 
include re-routing, re-timing of trips, re-distribution etc.   
 
An allowance was then estimated for these secondary effects, based on three sources: 
 
• UK evidence for trunk road project evaluations, comparing the use of fixed trip and variable trip matrix 
evaluations (these exclude the 're-assignment' response). 
• London Transportation Studies analyses, which directly address all feedback responses (including re-
assignment).  
• Special tests using the Auckland Regional Transport Model, also to address all feedback responses. 
The results indicated that the initial travel time benefits need to be reduced by about 50% to allow for these 
secondary effects.  
 
Impact on vehicle operating costs 
Based on examining typical vehicle operating cost functions in congested urban conditions, it was 
concluded that changes in traffic speed would result in vehicle operating cost increases valued at about 7% 
of the adjusted marginal time decongestion cost rates.   
 
5.6 Parking Benefits 
Many commuters, particularly to CBD areas, do not pay the full (resource) costs of their parking spaces: any 
such shortfall between price paid and resource costs is an externality appropriate for inclusion in the 
assessment. 
 
For peak period travel, estimates were made for each main centre of average externality costs for commuters 
to CBD areas and to other areas.  For off-peak travel (for which parking is generally of shorter duration and 
less often subsidised), parking externality costs were assumed to be zero. 
 
5.7 Results Summary 
The results for each of the above four areas of benefit assessment were weighted according to the estimated 
diversion proportions, and then combined to derive marginal benefit rates per additional passenger 
kilometre by peak and off-peak periods in each centre.  The findings are summarised in Table 3. 
 
Key features of these findings are that: 
 
• Environmental and safety benefits together are relatively constant (8¢ - 13¢ per marginal passenger km) 
across all centres and peak and off-peak periods. 
• Time and vehicle operating cost benefits reflect the levels of traffic congestion, and are only significant 
in peak periods.  In the most congested situations (Auckland, Wellington) these benefits dominate 
other benefit sources.  (Parking benefits have not been fully quantified at this stage). 
 
We note that, at this stage, results for each centre are not disaggregated beyond the peak v off-peak split: 
while the decongestion analyses would, at least in theory, permit breakdowns of results by major corridor, 
these have  not been applied to date.  
 
We also note that, at this stage, all benefit rates have been expressed on a per passenger kilometre basis.  
However, 'decongestion' benefits, in particular, are more related to traffic volumes through critical 
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bottlenecks than to system-wide changes in vehicle kilometres:  this refinement is addressed in subsequent 
sections.  
 
TABLE 3:  SUMMARY OF MARGINAL MODE-SWITCHING EXTERNALITY BENEFIT RATES 
BY CENTRE 
Externality Rates – c/Diverted Pass Km (1) Period Item Auckland Wellington Christchurch Other 
Peak Envt, Safety 11.4 11.2 13.3 11.9 
 Time, VOC 49.9 40.8 5.0 0.0 
Off-Peak Envt, safety 9.1 8.0 11.8 10.1 
 Notes: (1) Parking benefits not included in these estimates. 
 
6. ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT USER BENEFIT RATES 
When public transport services are subsidised and improved (in order to attract additional passengers), then 
benefits accrue to existing passengers, in terms of reduced waiting times, lower fares etc (this is known as 
the Mohring effect (Mohring 1972).  These benefits are the second type of externality benefits referred to 
earlier. 
 
Extension of the economic analysis outlined earlier (Section 4.2) shows that the benefits to existing 
passengers per additional passenger attracted by subsidy may be expressed as:  
   Bpp = G/eg 
 where G = 'generalised cost' of the typical public transport trip (ie the weighted sum of walking 
time, waiting time, in-vehicle time, fares etc)  
  eg = 'elasticity' of public transport demand with respect to this generalised cost. 
(It may also be shown that G/eg = F/ef, where F is the typical fare and ef the fares elasticity.) 
 
The available evidence indicates that eg  is relatively stable for different trip lengths in different cities: typical 
values would be –1.0 for peak periods, -1.5 for off-peak periods. 
 
G will vary by individual trip, but is broadly a function of trip length.  Examination of a range of typical 
trips (in the NZ urban context) indicated  the following variation of G (per passenger) with trip length: 
  G = $2.65 + $0.48 * trip length. 
 
This relationship, and the above values of eg, have been used to derive the function of Bpp against trip length. 
 
 
7. BASIS OF TRANSFUND PAYMENTS 
7.1 Payment Measures and Benefit Rates 
When paying for performance (in this case, benefits) based on some performance measure, the specific 
measure chosen is a key decision because it drives the incentives. To turn the benefit values into a scale of 
payment rates, Transfund needed to decide how payments should best be related to alternative measures of 
the passenger task (eg passenger boardings, passenger kilometres). A payment based simply on boardings 
would encourage, over time, a system of short trips. A payment based on passenger kilometres would 
encourage extended systems, possibly beyond the distance where congestion was an issue. 
 
The criteria for selecting the measure were that the measure should: 
 
• be a 'driver' of externality benefits (congestion relief, user benefits, etc) 
• be measurable (and auditable) on a consistent basis, without unreasonable resource requirements 
• be able to be disaggregated by 'corridor' and time period (peak v off-peak principally) and possibly 
other market dimensions (eg adult v child). 
 
Examining which measures drive the main categories of externality benefits led to these conclusions: 
 
• 'Decongestion' (time, vehicle operating costs).  The most appropriate measure of congestion impacts 
was firstly passengers across critical cordons (reflecting key bottlenecks, eg round the CBD) and 
secondly passenger kilometres (as a reflection of traffic congestion more generally). Because passenger 
count data across cordons were not generally available, this measure could (but less satisfactorily) be 
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replaced by total passenger boardings.  Thus for the average trip length, we selected 50% passenger 
boardings plus 50% passenger kilometres as the appropriate measure. 
• Environment and safety.  The most appropriate measure was taken as total passenger kilometres.  
• Public transport user benefits.  Analyses of the benefit function (Section 6) indicates that, for average 
trip lengths, the appropriate measure is ~50% passenger boardings plus 50% passenger kilometres.   
 
Combining these conclusions, we expressed the benefit rates for each of these categories as linear functions 
of passenger boardings and passenger kilometres.  The results are given in the first part of Table 4, for peak 
and off-peak periods.  It is evident that: 
 
• In peak periods, decongestion and public transport user benefits dominate: the total benefit rate is split 
broadly equally (for typical length trips) between the boarding component and the distance 
component. 
• In off-peak periods, without decongestion impacts, the distance-related component accounts for the 
major part of the total benefits. 
 
TABLE 4:   SUMMARY OF BENEFIT RATES AND PAYMENT RATES 
  (Rates per Passenger Boarding and Passenger km) 
Rates by Centre - $ per Pass Boarding (1) Period Item 
Auckland Wellington Christchurch Other 
TOTAL BENEFIT RATES      
Peak Decongestion 3.70+0.40*D 2.46+0.26D 0.24+0.03*D - 
 Envt & Safety 0.11*D 0.11*D 0.13*D 0.12*D 
 PT User Benefits 2.65+0.48*D 2.65+0.48*D 2.65+0.48*D 2.65+0.48*D 
 Total 6.35+0.99*D 5.11+0.86*D 2.89+0.64*D 2.65+0.60*D 
Off Peak Decongestion - - - - 
 Envt & Safety 0.09*D 0.08*D 0.12*D 0.10*D 
 PT User Benefits 1.77+0.32*D 1.77+0.32*D 1.77+0.32*D 1.77+0.32*D 
 Total 1.77+0.41*D 1.77+0.40*D 1.77+0.44*D 1.77+0.42*D 
TRANSFUND PAYMENT RATES (2)    
Peak  1.45+0.21*D 1.05+0.17*D 0.30+0.09*D 0.20+0.08*D 
Off-Peak  0.15+0.06*D 0.15+0.06*D 0.15+0.06*D 0.15+0.06*D 
Notes  (1) Rates are combination of fixed amount and distance component (D= distance in kms).  
 (2)  Rates based on one-third of (decongestion benefits + environmental & safety benefits + 25% PT user benefits)  
- refer text.  Rates have in some cases been rounded for consistency with rates set by Transfund (as in Table 1).  
 
7.2 Transfund Payment Rates 
Under present legislation, Transfund's statutory objective is to fund a safe and efficient roading system, 
while regional councils have primary responsibility for the funding of passenger transport (but with a 
contribution from Transfund).  In the light of this objective, Transfund's financial assistance policy for 
'Alternatives to Roading' (ATR) investments was hitherto to fund 100% of road user benefits relating to State 
highways and around 50% of benefits for local roads, but not to make any funding contribution towards 
public transport passenger benefits. 
 
For the Patronage Funding scheme, Transfund decided that it would set payment rates based on the 
following formula: 
Payment rate P = (Bpr + 0.25*Bpp)/3.0  
 where P = Transfund payment rate per additional public transport passenger 
  Bpr = road user and related (externality) benefits, per additional passenger 
  Bpp = existing public transport user benefits, per additional passenger 
  3.0 =  a factor to reflect funding constraints and risk effects  
The factor (3.0) is designed to be consistent with the medium-term expected benefit-cost hurdle rate for road 
schemes (ie 4.0), adjusted to reflect the lesser degree of risk associated with Patronage Funding (Section 4.3). 
 
The factor 0.25 applied to public transport user benefits represents a compromise between Transfund's  
previous policy of no funding for public transport user benefits and its funding of a larger proportion (50%-
100%) of road user benefits.  Consequent on this decision, Transfund is currently reviewing its funding 
policy relating to public transport capital (ATR) projects. 
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The Transfund payment rates that result from applying the above formula are shown in the lower section of 
Table 4.  
 
7.3 Comparison with Existing Average Funding Rates 
Prior to the introduction of Patronage Funding, Transfund's average funding rates (40% of bus subsidy and 
60% of rail subsidy – refer Section 2.2) averaged 5¢-6¢/passenger kilometre for bus and rail (contracted and 
commercial) services in main centres, and about 3¢/passenger kilometre for bus services in smaller centres. 
These are very averaged figures: for instance, in Wellington the Transfund subsidies were about 
9¢/passenger km for contracted bus services, 1¢/passenger km for commercial bus services (relating to 
concessionary fare schemes), and 4¢/passenger km for suburban rail services.  
 
By contrast, the Patronage Funding payment rates for trips of average length in Wellington are about 
40¢/pass km (peak) and 8¢/pass km (off-peak) for bus (average 4.6 km trip length); and 21¢/pass km (peak) 
and 6¢/pass km (off-peak) for rail (average 23 kms trip length). 
 
Thus the Patronage Funding payment rates are significantly higher in most cases than the average rates for 
the existing patronage, which developed under the previous input funding system. This is not surprising, 
given that: 
 
• A substantial proportion of the existing services operate on a 'commercial' basis, with very low subsidy 
rates. The existing contracted services thus involve a range of subsidy rates higher than the average for 
all services. 
• The major objectives of the Patronage Funding scheme were to increase patronage and to increase the 
central government (Transfund) share of total public transport funding.  In order to achieve these 
objectives, Transfund's variable funding rates need to be significantly higher than the previous average 
funding rates. 
• Further, given the prevailing cost structures and market demand characteristics (demand elasticities), it 
was necessary for marginal funding rates to exceed existing average rates if the desired expansion of 
services was to be achieved (see below).  
 
7.4 Comparison with Incremental Costs 
Prior to finalising the Patronage Funding payment rates, Transfund analysed the likely costs and revenues 
for expanded services in a range of situations, to assess the likely response to the Transfund payment rates 
(in terms of service and patronage increases). 
 
The main conclusions were: 
 
• Incremental subsidy costs (per passenger km) cover a wide range.  The extent of response is likely to 
vary gradually, rather than sharply, with increasing generosity of payment rates. 
• A critical factor influencing response will be the extent of current suppressed demand due to 
insufficient capacity (during peak periods and in major metropolitan areas).  An incremental subsidy 
rate in the order of 10¢ to 20¢ per passenger kilometre is likely to be sufficient to encourage additional 
peak services to meet this demand; a lower rate (in some cases zero) would be sufficient to encourage 
additional off-peak services. 
• In the absence of substantial suppressed demand, peak period bus subsidy costs would be much 
higher, typically in the range 30¢ to 150¢ per passenger km; while off-peak rates would be a lot lower, 
typically zero to 30¢ per passenger kilometre. 
 
If these incremental (net) cost rates are compared with the Patronage Funding rates (above), it appears that: 
 
• For peak periods, the Patronage Funding rates should be more than sufficient to encourage additional 
services in cases of suppressed demand, but barely sufficient in other cases.  
• For off-peak periods, the Patronage Funding rates should be sufficient to encourage a modest 
expansion of existing services. 
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8. PHASED IMPLEMENTATION – THE 'KICK-START FUNDING' 
SCHEME 
8.1 Rationale 
The main Patronage Funding scheme (as described up till now) only provides additional funding once 
additional passengers are generated, and also imposes increased financial risks on the regional councils.  
Thus, on its own, it would be a relatively slow means of developing the market and increasing central 
government funding.  However, the government wished to increase patronage over a shorter timescale and 
allocated additional funding to do so.  To achieve this, Transfund developed a 'Kick-start Funding' scheme 
as a short-term transition to the full Patronage Funding scheme. 
 
The broad objectives defined for Kick-start Funding were to expedite new services and other initiatives to 
accelerate patronage growth, and to share the risk associated with new services.  To guide development of 
the scheme, Transfund set the following criteria that should be met: 
 
• provide up-front funding for initiatives to accelerate patronage growth 
• enable regional councils to access funding quickly and simply 
• meet Transfund's requirements to evaluate expenditure and achieve value for money 
• be consistent with the longer term patronage funding scheme.  
 
8.2 Scheme Description 
The following provides a summary description of the Kick-start Funding scheme. 
 
Key Features 
(i) Kick-start Funding will apply for the period November 2000-June 2003, along with full Patronage 
Funding.  Thereafter, only Patronage Funding will apply. 
 
(ii) The objective of Kick-start Funding is to provide up-front funding assistance for new services and 
other initiatives that will generate patronage growth. 
 
(iii) Transfund’s funding assistance is based on the following proportions of the net costs of approved 
new services and initiatives: 
 - 80% of costs incurred from 1 November 2000 to 30 June 2001 
 - 60% of costs incurred from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 
 - 40% of costs incurred from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003.  
 (The combination of patronage funding and Kick-start Funding could provide up to 100% of the net 
cost of new passenger services, particularly in the initial period to 30 June 2001.) 
 
(iv) Transfund has identified a list of qualifying expenditure items for Kick-start Funding, that includes 
new passenger transport services and, among other things, marketing initiatives, electronic ticketing 
projects and other 'capital' items of less than $400,000.  Regional councils are able to propose other 
initiatives, provided they relate to the objective of increasing patronage.  
  
(v) From 1 July 2003, a new base level of funding and patronage will be set for each regional council for 
the Patronage Funding scheme: this will include the current funding base plus average Transfund 
payments on Kick-start Funding and Patronage Funding up to 30 June 2003 (excluding certain 'one-
off' expenditures).  (This gives regional councils a strong incentive to invest Kick-start Funding in 
initiatives that have the best prospects for growing patronage).  
 
Passenger Transport Infrastructure 
(vi) Passenger transport capital projects of $400,000 or less qualify for Kick-start Funding. 
 
(vii) Transfund also continues to fund passenger transport capital projects over $400,000 through its 
current Alternatives to Roading (ATR) funding policies, adjusted for combined capital and patronage 
payments to make sure that the same project is not paid for twice. 
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Applying for Funding 
(viii) To apply for Kick-start Funding, regional councils must submit applications to Transfund covering a 
brief scheme description and estimates of net costs, gross costs, passenger boardings and/or 
passenger kilometres, plus estimates of fare revenue and a supporting rationale. 
 
Monitoring and Review 
(ix) Transfund requires regional councils to analyse and report on the success of their Kick-start Funding 
strategies in terms of their effectiveness at generating patronage and on the rate of diversion of new 
passengers from private cars.  This information will become part of a valuable database shared with 
other regional councils (and perhaps comparable with the public transport demonstration projects 
undertaken in Norway).  
 
 
9. PROGRESS AND OUTCOMES TO DATE 
Eight of the 14 regional councils joined the scheme for 2000/01, representing 99.4% of current funding. Most 
have joined to ensure they benefit from the Kick-start Funding, but some have expressed concerns about the 
situation after Kick-start Funding ceases. Certainly, the Kick-start Funding has proved popular and has 
resulted in many projects being initiated. 
 
Table 5 presents a summary of the funding applications submitted to date and those already approved by 
Transfund. Of the 67 Kick-start Funding applications received, 43 have been approved so far.  Some were 
rejected because a simplified evaluation indicated that the expenditure was not efficient (ie benefits were 
less than costs); others were rejected because they did not comply with legal or policy requirements. 
 
Figure 2 provides an indication of the expected impacts of the Patronage Funding scheme (including Kick-
start Funding) on total central government (Transfund) funding levels to public transport.  In the years 
1996/97 - 1999/2000, this funding was capped at 1996 levels (approx $42m).  We expect that Kick-start 
Funding plus Patronage Funding will increase funding by about $12 million pa above previous funding 
levels. Transfund expects expenditure to increase by $20-30 million pa over the next few years (depending 
on the success of the scheme in increasing total patronage). 
 
At this stage, it is too early to assess the impacts of the scheme on patronage.  Some regions are indicating 
very good early results: Auckland, Canterbury and Hamilton report up to 10% pa growth rates, whereas 
established regions such as Wellington and Otago report steady 2% growth. Canterbury’s innovative 
Orbiter service (on a circular route) has had unprecedented success. Auckland is currently implementing a 
major strategy to expand ferry services.  Regions are currently establishing data systems (eg defining peaks) 
and getting agreement on their funding and patronage baselines.  
 
TABLE 5:  KICK-START FUNDING APPLICATIONS RECEIVED AND APPROVED BY 
TRANSFUND (Figures as at 31 May 2001). 
Requested ($m) Approved ($m) 
Region Payment Measure 
Kick-start Funding 
Schemes 2000/01 Total(1) 2000/01  Total(1)  
Auckland  Hybrid Rideline Website, shelters  
Bus, ferry & rail  service 
enhancements 
 0.95 3.23 0.95 3.12 
Wellington    Hybrid Improve rail & bus services  
Real time information  
Commuter car parks 
1.68 6.49 1.22 2.83 
Canterbury Boarding Increased services, circular 
service, integrated ticketing 
0.4 1.54 0.24 0.78 
Other  Boarding or 
Flat 
Services, shelters, stations 0.34 2.14 0.19 1.45 
Total   3.37 13.41 2.60 8.18 
Notes (1) Total  refers to total Transfund allocation from 2000/01 up to end of Kick-start Funding transition period 
(30 June 2003) 
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Figure 2: Transfund Funding Allocations for Public Transport – Actual and Projected 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. SOME ON-GOING ISSUES 
10.1 Implications of the Output – funding Approach 
The difference in approach between Transfund's previous input-based funding policies (for both roads and 
passenger transport) and the output-based Patronage Funding policy are reiterated here.  The previous 
policies involved Transfund paying a proportion of input costs for a scheme or service.  Under Patronage 
Funding, Transfund pays an amount (as defined earlier), according to the success of the service in attracting 
additional passengers.  In some cases, this may cover only a small proportion of the incremental costs (if the 
service is not sufficiently attractive to passengers). In other cases Transfund may cover a large proportion of 
the costs.  The decisions on the services to be provided are left to the regional council, which is given full 
responsibility for the patronage (and hence funding) risks involved. 
 
 
10.2 Exogenous Patronage Influences 
The theory underlying Patronage Funding is that a targeted patronage-related funding system will 
encourage regional councils to expand services, and hence generate increases in patronage, where the 
resulting benefits warrant the additional costs involved.   
 
In practice, patronage is influenced by a range of factors other than service (or fare) enhancements.  Such 
exogenous factors could lead to 'windfall' payments from Transfund to regional councils, without any 
changes in services. This effect could potentially be a cause of inequity between regions (eg different 
population growth rates).  This is one reason that Transfund requires regional councils at least to maintain 
their own current payment levels. 
 
Some exogenous factors that cause patronage changes may result in road user externality benefits (eg 
changes in fuel prices may also cause switching from car to public transport). Such factors may also result in 
benefits to existing public transport users (eg. if they result in additional services). In some cases, they may 
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result in neither category of benefit (eg an increase in disposable income may lead to additional off-peak 
public transport travel but no change in service levels or road traffic volumes).  Thus, in some cases the 
additional Patronage Funding payments may have some justification in terms of the resulting benefits; in 
other cases they may not be justified in such terms.   
 
Another point in relation to exogenous factors is that, where they cause an increase in patronage, it is most 
likely (at least in the medium-term) that services will need to be increased to accommodate the demand, and 
subsidies also increased (at least for peak services).  Thus, there is a cost-sharing argument (rather than a 
benefit argument) for increasing Transfund's funding amounts in such circumstances.  In any event, in 
practice it is not possible to distinguish between extra passengers generated by service enhancements and 
those resulting from exogenous factors.  
 
10.3 Risk Implications for Regional Councils - Contracted Services 
As noted earlier, one implication of Patronage Funding is that regional councils assume increased financial 
risk compared with the previous system.  If patronage increases due to exogenous factors, regional councils 
will generally receive more income from Transfund (even though their subsidy costs on the services affected 
may decrease); when regional councils institute service enhancements, their net subsidy costs depend on the 
success of these enhancements in generating patronage and hence attracting additional Transfund funding. 
 
In cases where service contracts are on a gross cost basis, the financial risk to regional councils is particularly 
severe: if patronage is below the expected level, the regional council loses twice – it receives lower fare 
revenue and also lower payments from Transfund.  In cases where service contracts are on a net cost basis 
(the prevalent New Zealand form), the regional council bears rather less risk – it receives lower payments 
from Transfund, but the fare revenue risk is borne by the operator. This aligns the regional council’s 
incentives more closely with those of the operators. 
 
Regional councils could eliminate financial risk on service contracts by adopting 'back-to-back' patronage-
related contracts with operators, ie they could contract to pay the operator on the same formula as they are 
paid by Transfund, which is a fixed sum plus a patronage-related payment. Such contracts would provide to 
the operator incentive signals identical to those that Transfund provides to the regional council through the 
Patronage Funding scheme. 
 
To date, no regional council has adopted such patronage-incentive ('back-to-back') contracts as a result of 
Patronage Funding: although two pilot contracts of 'output-based funding' are currently operating, these 
were in place prior to the Patronage Funding scheme (refer Mein 1999). Transfund is encouraging regional 
councils to develop and implement such contracts and we expect further trials within the next two years.  
 
10.4 Implications for Commercial Services 
Currently 'commercial' services form a substantial proportion of the bus services in the main corridors of the 
larger centres. These service receive a very low (if any) level of public funding, through concessionary fare 
reimbursement schemes, and are largely outside the influence of the regional councils (Section 2.1). 
Patronage Funding is designed to increase patronage where the greatest benefits arise, and hence gives 
incentives to regional councils to enhance services where congestion is most severe, ie in the main corridors 
of the larger centres at peak periods.  A large proportion of these services currently operate commercially. 
 
Analogous to the back-to-back incentive arrangements discussed above for contracted services, a similar 
form of patronage-related incentive scheme would appear to be appropriate for commercial services.  This is 
the concept of 'subsidised deregulation', under which operators compete in a 'quasi-commercial' market in 
which patronage-related subsidies are available to all participants.  This approach was discussed in a 
previous Thredbo paper (Wallis 1999).  
 
Some legal issues will need to be resolved before this concept can be implemented in New Zealand.  The 
current concessionary fare reimbursement scheme for commercial services, under which particular users are 
subsidised, is a limited form of 'subsidised deregulation'.  Again, we see this as a concept that should be 
pursued further. 
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10.5 Implications for Capital Projects  
Prior to Patronage Funding, passenger transport services and infrastructure (capital) projects were funded 
through two very different systems. Patronage Funding for services has significant implications for the 
future funding of infrastructure, which are currently being addressed by the government. 
 
Hitherto, infrastructure projects were evaluated using a cost-benefit approach (the ATR procedures), based 
on forecasts of future patronage impacts and associated benefits.  Such patronage impacts (whether from 
services or infrastructure) are now being funded through the Patronage Funding scheme: this would result 
in funding the same patronage twice. 
 
At first sight, this 'double-dipping' could be avoided by abolishing separate capital funding, leaving 
Patronage Funding as the sole Transfund funding mechanism.  However this approach raises significant 
issues and is probably too simplistic: 
 
• Funding infrastructure solely through Patronage Funding would require the regional council (or other 
investors) to put in up-front capital and to recoup this over time from the increased Patronage Funding.  
The investor takes all the risk that the infrastructure will generate the forecast patronage growth.  For 
some types of project, this risk may deter investment.  The risks would be increased by the potential for 
future changes in government funding policy (eg. changes in Patronage Funding rates).  
• Patronage Funding payments are based on average benefits over a region.  Often infrastructure projects 
are targeted at a particular bottleneck or constraint, so the benefits of such projects may well exceed the 
net present value of the additional patronage payments.  In such cases, it may be appropriate to pay the 
additional amount as a lump sum capital contribution. 
• An alternative approach, which would minimise risks to investors (including regional councils) would 
be for Transfund to continue to fund infrastructure on an input basis, based on the current (or similar) 
procedures; but then to deduct the capital payment from the Patronage Funding allocation on an on-
going basis. 
• In New Zealand context, legal restrictions on regional councils' ownership of infrastructure add to the 
complexity.  Generally infrastructure is provided and funded through a separate local authority.  This 
exacerbates the situation as one party puts up the capital funding, while another receives the Patronage 
Funding payments. 
 
10.6 Other Regional Concerns 
The 14 New Zealand regions may be broadly divided into two groups, each facing different issues: 
 
 
• Developing systems: areas with current low levels of public transport service and usage, with high 
medium-term growth potential, but with high short-term costs to expand services. 
• Mature systems: areas with relatively high levels of service and lower growth potential, but facing 
problems of infrastructure replacement and rising costs.  
 
The 'developing' regions face high costs of establishing public transport infrastructure (bus priority lanes, 
stations, rail lines) and new services, with uncertain patronage forecasts. Kick-start Funding is most 
appropriate in these situations, because the regions cannot achieve patronage growth without significant 
investment, and patronage growth can take a long time to get established. These regions have recently been 
experiencing high patronage growth because of fuel price increases, and can therefore anticipate significant 
Patronage Funding in the near term. However, these increases may be short-lived. 
 
The 'mature' regions have established systems with a relatively high level of service and high patronage. 
These systems generally face increased costs over time, but low potential for patronage growth and hence 
limited Patronage Funding. Some regions face high costs to maintain their currently failing infrastructure, 
and expect to lose patronage should they fail to replace rail carriages and upgrade facilities. Regions with 
large proportions of commercial services face the risk of losing patronage if commercial services decline. 
 
All regions are concerned about losing funding if patronage falls as a result of exogenous factors outside 
their control, such as reduced car and fuel prices, economic downturn or population decline.  
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11.  CONCLUSIONS: MERITS OF THE NEW APPROACH 
Patronage Funding is an innovative method of allocating central government funding for passenger 
transport to regional/local authorities, whereby funding is directly related to the achievement of the 
benefits of interest to central government.  The scheme can potentially cover both subsidy to services and 
capital investment for infrastructure within an integrated funding basis.  The scheme may be accompanied 
by 'back-to-back' contracting arrangements with public transport operators, although this is not essential.  
 
Transfund considers that Patronage Funding has significant advantages over the previous system of 
funding passenger transport services in New Zealand.  In summary, the key improvements resulting from 
the move to Patronage Funding are: 
 
• funding for passenger transport services is targeted to the regions where it provides the greatest 
benefits - for example where there is significant road congestion 
• regional councils that are successful in attracting more passengers are rewarded for their efforts 
• all regional councils – including those that currently receive little or no funding –have the opportunity 
to fund new passenger transport services 
• regional councils are given the major responsibility in designing passenger transport services that suit 
their regions and meet users’ needs. 
It is too early to draw conclusions on the impacts of the new scheme in practice.  It will undoubtedly evolve 
considerably over the next two years: we hope to be able to report further on its success at Thredbo 8.  
 
12. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This paper is published with permission of Transfund New Zealand, but the authors take responsibility for 
the opinions expressed.  The Patronage Funding scheme was developed with inputs from a number of 
parties, including Transfund New Zealand, the New Zealand Ministry of Transport, Regional Councils, Bus 
& Coach Association, TranzRail Ltd with the assistance from Booz·Allen & Hamilton and co-consultants 
(Traffic Design Group, Pinnacle Research, NZ Institute of Economic Research) and peer reviewers Sinclair 
Knight Merz. 
 
13. REFERENCES 
Booz·Allen & Hamilton (2000).  'Effects of Public Transport System Changes on Mode Switching and Road Traffic 
Levels'.  Transfund New Zealand Research Report No. 179. 
 
Booz·Allen & Hamilton (2000).  'Passenger Transport Evaluation and Funding Procedures (Stage 2).  Draft Final 
Report to Transfund New Zealand, September 2000. 
 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994).  'Investing under Uncertainty' 
 
Kimber and Hollis (1979).  'Traffic Queues and Delays at Road Junctions'.  Transport and Road Research 
Laboratory, Report 909. 
 
Mein B (1999).  'Matching Funding to Outcomes: Incentive-based Contracts for Passenger Transport'.  Paper to 
Sixth International Conference on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport, Cape Town, 
September 1999. 
 
Mohring H. (1972).  'Optimisation and Scale Economies in Urban Bus Transportation'.  American Economic 
Review Vol. 62(4), pp 591-604. 
 
NZIER (1998). ‘Transfund Ratios’.  Report to Transfund New Zealand, May 1998. 
 
NZIER (2000).  'Some Economic Aspects of Patronage Funding'.  Report to Transfund New Zealand, September 
2000. 
 
Wallis I P (1999).  'Public Transport Developments in Australasia'.  Paper to Sixth International Conference on 
Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport, Cape Town, September 1999. 
 
Walis I P (1995).  'Urban Bus Reform Down Under – Six Years of Words, Actions and Achievements'.  Keynote 
Paper to Fourth International Conference on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport, 
Rotorua, New Zealand. 
 
Wallis I P (1993).  'Land Transport Deregulation New Zealand Style:  Experience to Date'.  Paper to Third 
International Conference on Competition and Ownership in Surface Passenger Transport, Mississauga, 
Canada.  
